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Abstract
We introduce a new method to rank single elements
given an order over their sets. For this purpose,
we extend the game theoretic notion of marginal
contribution and of Banzhaf index to our ordinal
framework. Furthermore, we characterize the re-
sulting ordinal Banzhaf solution by means of a set
of properties inspired from those used to axiomat-
ically characterize another solution from the litera-
ture: the ceteris paribus majority. Finally, we show
that the computational procedure for these two so-
cial ranking solutions boils down to a weighted
combination of comparisons over the same subsets
of elements.
1 Introduction
In decision making and social choice theory, a number of
studies are devoted to ranking individuals based on the per-
formance of the coalitions formed by them. For instance,
in cooperative game theory, (marginalistic) power indices
like the Banzhaf value [Banzhaf III, 1964] and the Shapley
value [Shapley, 1953] are defined to measure the importance
of individuals based on their marginal contributions to all pos-
sible coalitions of players. Such methods can be used in a va-
riety of applications, such as, comparing the influence of dif-
ferent countries inside an international council (for instance,
the European Union Council); or finding the most “valuable”
items, when the preferences of a user are defined over their
combinations.
However, in many real world applications, a precise eval-
uation on the coalitions’ “power” may be hard for many rea-
sons (e.g., uncertain data, complexity of the analysis, missing
information or difficulties in the update, etc.). In this case, it
may be interesting to consider only ordinal information con-
cerning binary comparisons between coalitions.
The main objective of this paper is to study the problem
of finding an ordinal ranking over the set N of individu-
als (called social ranking), given an ordinal ranking over its
power set (called power relation).
This work has been supported by the project ANR-14CE24-
0007-01 “CoCoRICo-CoDec”.
Example 1. Consider the total and transitive power relation
 such that:
1  2  12  3  13  23  234  34  14;
14  4  24  124  1234  134  ;  123: (1)
Our aim is to answer the questions of type: does individual 1
have more influence than individual 2?
Despite the huge number of papers about cooperative
games and their solutions as well as their extensions to games
with imprecise valuation of coalitions (for more information
see, for instance, [Suijs et al., 1999; Branzei et al., 2010;
Marichal and Roubens, 1998]), a notion of ordinal power
index has been introduced only recently in the literature in
terms of a classical solution concept for cooperative games
that is also invariant to the choice of the characteristic func-
tion representing the ranking over the coalitions [Moretti,
2015]. However, this invariant solution is properly defined
for a very limited class of total preorders over the set of all
coalitions.
Following a property-driven approach, in [Moretti and
O¨ztu¨rk, 2017] the authors provide some impossibility theo-
rems showing that no ordinal power index, also called so-
cial ranking solution, satisfies a given set of attractive prop-
erties. Also in [Bernardi et al., 2017], the authors axiomati-
cally characterize a social ranking solution based on the idea
that the most influential individuals are those which belong
to coalitions ranked in the highest positions. Another social
ranking solution has been proposed and studied in [Haret et
al., 2018], where two individuals are ranked using informa-
tion from ceteris paribus (i.e., everything else being equal)
comparisons over all possible coalitions. The resulting rank-
ing, called CP-majority, is not necessarily transitive. So, a
domain restriction over the family of ranking of coalitions is
proposed in [Haret et al., 2018] to guarantee the transitivity of
the ranking over the individuals. We also notice that the social
ranking problem can be seen as the inverse formulation of the
well-known problem from the literature of deriving a ranking
over the set of all subsets of N , in a compatible way with a
primitive ranking over the single elements of N . This prob-
lem is generally called ranking sets of objects (see [Barbera`
et al., 2004] for a survey).
In this article, we propose a new social ranking solution
based on an ordinal version of the notions of marginal contri-
bution and of Banzhaf value [Banzhaf III, 1964]. For this
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solution, we provide an axiomatic characterization that is
mostly inspired from the axioms used in [Haret et al., 2018]
to characterize the CP-majority solution on a set of only two
individuals. Both the CP-majority and the ordinal Banzhaf
solution suggest an interpretation of our social ranking prob-
lem along the lines of a virtual election, with groups of in-
dividuals (coalitions) playing the role of voters: according to
the CP-majority solution, a coalition S prefers individual i to
individual j if S [ fig  S [ fjg, i.e. coalition S [ fig
is “stronger” than coalition S [ fjg; according to the ordi-
nal Banzhaf solution, coalition S approves an individual i if
S [ fig  S, i.e. the marginal contribution of i to S [ fig
is positive. Under this interpretation, we propose a new fam-
ily of relations on the elements of N that we call weighted
majority relations, and we show that the CP-majority and the
ordinal Banzhaf solution are special cases of this family.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 introduces basic notions and notations. Section 3 is
devoted to the definition of the ordinal Banzhaf relation and
its main features as a social ranking solution. Section 4 is
devoted to the discussion of an axiomatic characterization of
the ordinal Banzhaf solution and to its comparison with the
CP-majority. Section 5 introduces weighted majority rules.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
Let N = f1; : : : ; ng be a finite set of elements or individuals
and let R  N  N be a binary relation on N (xRy mean-
ing that x is in relation R with y, for x; y 2 N ). A binary
relation R on N is said to be: reflexive, if for each i 2 N ,
iRi; transitive, if for each i; j; z 2 N , (iRj and jRk) )
iRk; total, if for each i; j 2 N , i 6= j ) iRj or jRi; anti-
symmetric, if for each i; j 2 N , iRj and jRi ) i = j. A
preorder is a reflexive and transitive binary relation. A pre-
order that is total is called total preorder. An antysimmetric
total preorder is called linear order (each equivalence class is
a singleton). We denote by T (N) the set of all total preorders
on N , and by L(2N ) the set of all linear orders on 2N . Fol-
lowing the notations in [Haret et al., 2018], a power relation
is a binary relation 2 B(2N ) where B(2N ) is the family of
all subsets of 2N  2N . For all S; T 2 2N , S  T means that
(S; T ) 2 and (T; S) =2 and S  T means that (S; T ) 2
and (T; S) 2. A social ranking solution or solution on
A  N , is a function RA : C  B(2N )  ! T (A) asso-
ciating to each power relation 2 C a total preorder RA()
(or RA) over the elements of A. By this definition, the notion
iRAj means that applying the social ranking solution to the
power relation  gives the result that i is ranked higher than
or equal to j. Since RA is a total preorder, we denote by I

A
its symmetric part, and by PA its asymmetric part. We de-
note by Ui = fS 2 2N : i =2 Sg the set of coalitions without
i and by Uij = fS 2 2N : i; j =2 Sg the set of coalitions not
containing neither i nor j.
Finally, we provide few well-known definitions from game
theory. A Transferable Utility (TU)-game is a pair (N; v)
where v is a function v : 2N ! R such that v(;) =
0. The Banzhaf value (v) of v is the n-vector (v) =
(1(v); 2(v); : : : ; n(v)), such that for each i 2 N :
i(v) =
1
2n 1
X
S2Ui
 
v(S [ fig)  v(S): (2)
3 Ordinal Banzhaf Index
We start by showing that the Banzhaf value defined in equa-
tion 2 is very sensible to small changes on the values of v.
Consider a situation where a complete ranking over the
subsets of N is given. For instance, take the power rela-
tion on 2f1;2;3g such that 123  12  1  23  2  13
 3  ;. If a real-valued function is available represent-
ing the “strength” of each coalition on a numerical scale such
that S  T , v(S)  v(T ), it would be possible to com-
pare the social ranking (power) of individuals 1 and 2 using
the Banzhaf value of v. It is easy to check that the difference
of Banzhaf values i(v)   j(v) for each i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g
can be written as follows:
i(v)  j(v) = 1
2
(v(i)  v(j)) + 1
2
(v(ik)  v(jk)) (3)
One can verify that the difference 1(v) 2(v) can be made
positive or negative with a suitable choice of v compatible
with the constraint v(1) > v(23) > v(2) > v(13). For in-
stance, consider the functions v0 and v00 such that v0(1) = 4,
v0(23) = 3, v0(2) = 2, v0(13) = 1 +  and v00(1) = 4,
v00(23) = 3, v00(2) = 2, v00(13) = 1   , with 1 >  > 0.
Both v0 and v00 satisfy the aforementioned constraints, but
according to relation (3), 1(v0) > 2(v0) and 2(v00) >
1(v
00), even for very small . In order to get more robust re-
sults to evaluate individuals, our goal is to introduce a social
ranking solution inspired from the classical notion of Banzhaf
value.
We begin with the notion of ordinal marginal contribution.
Definition 1 (Ordinal marginal contribution). Let 2
B(2N ). The ordinal marginal contribution mSi () of player
i w.r.t. coalition S, i =2 S, in power relation  is defined as:
mSi () =
(
1 if S [ fig  S;
 1 if S  S [ fig;
0 otherwise.
(4)
Example 2. Consider the power relation  of Example 1.
In , the ordinal marginal contribution of individual 2 w.r.t.
coalition 134, m1342 (), is equal to 1 since 1234  134
holds. However the ordinal marginal contribution of indi-
vidual 2 w.r.t. coalition 4, m42() , is  1 due to 4  24.
We denote by u+;i (u
 ;
i ) the number of coalitions S 2
Ui such that mSi () = 1 (mSi () =  1). We also refer
to the difference si = u
+;
i   u ;i as the ordinal Banzhaf
score of i in .
Definition 2 (Ordinal Banzhaf relation). Let 2 B(2N ) and
A  N . The ordinal Banzhaf relation is the binary relation
R^A  AA such that for all i; j 2 A:
iR^Aj , si  sj :
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S 2 U1 mS1 () S 2 U2 mS2 ()
; 1 ; 1
2  1 1  1
3  1 3  1
4 1 4  1
23  1 13  1
24  1 14  1
34  1 34 1
234  1 134 1
s

1 =  4 s2 =  2
Table 1: Ordinal marginal contributions of individuals 1 and 2 for
the power relation (1).
Remark 1. From the definition of ordinal Banzhaf score, it
immediately follows that the relation R^A on A  N is tran-
sitive and total. So, R^A is a social ranking solution.
Example 3. Consider the power relation of Example 1 and
let A = f1; 2g. We have
U1 = f;; 2; 3; 4; 23; 24; 34; 234g
and
U2 = f;; 1; 3; 4; 13; 14; 34; 134g
Ordinal marginal contributions and ordinal Banzhaf scores
of individuals 1 and 2 are reported in Table 1. Since s2 =
 2 >  4 = s1 , it follows 2P^A 1.
Example 4. Consider 123  12  1  23  2  13  3 
; given at the beginning of this section. Let A = f1; 2g be
the set of elements to be ranked. We have that m;1 = m
2
1 =
m31 = m
23
1 = 1 and m
;
2 = m
1
2 = m
3
2 = m
13
2 = 1. So,
s1 = s

2 = 4 and, according to the ordinal Banzhaf relation,
1 and 2 are indifferent, i.e. 1I^A 2.
As shown in the previous example, given a linear order re-
lation  on 2N , the social ranking provided by the ordinal
Banzhaf relation does not depend on the choice of a compat-
ible cardinal function v, and therefore it answers to the ini-
tial question of this section concerning robustness. Another
natural question is whether it always exists a cardinal evalua-
tion v compatible with , such that the ranking provided by
the classical Banzhaf value on v coincides with the ranking
provided by the ordinal Banzhaf relation on . A negative
answer to this question follows from Example 5.
Example 5. Consider the power relation  such that 123 
12  1  23  3  13  2  ;. Let A = f1; 2g be
the set of elements to be ranked. Consider every compatible
cardinal function v such that v(S)  v(T ) , S  T for
each S; T 2 2N . By relation (3) we have that
1(v)  2(v) = 1
2
(v(1)  v(2)) + 1
2
(v(13)  v(23)):
Since v(1)   v(2) > v(23)   v(13), we have that 1(v) >
2(v) (independently from the choice of v). On the other hand
m;1 = m
2
1 = m
23
1 = 1 and m
3
1 =  1, whereas m;2 = m12 =
m32 = m
13
2 = 1. So, s

1 = 2 and s

2 = 4. Then, according
to the ordinal Banzhaf relation, 2 is strictly better than 1, i.e.
2P^A 1, yielding an opposite conclusion with respect to the
classical Banzhaf value for every compatible function v.
4 Axiomatic Analysis
In this section, we introduce a set of axioms which are in-
spired from those in classical social choice theory [May,
1952] and in the axiomatic approach presented in [Haret et
al., 2018].
The first property requires that any permutation of coali-
tions that preserves the sign of the ordinal marginal contribu-
tions of individuals should not affect the social ranking. So,
a positive (negative) ordinal marginal contribution to distinct
coalitions S and T should carry the same weight.
Definition 3. (Coalitional Anonymity, CA) Let A  N . A
solution RA : C  B(2N ) ! T (A) satisfies the coalitional
anonymity axiom on C if and only if for all power relations
;w2 C, for all players i; j 2 A and bijections i : Ui ! Ui
and j : Uj ! Uj such that S [ fig  S , i(S) [ fig w
i(S) for all S 2 Ui and S [ fjg  S , j(S) [ fjg w
j(S) for all S 2 Uj , then it holds that iRAj , iRwAj.
The second axiom is a classical neutrality axiom, and it
states that a social ranking solution should not be biased in
favor of one alternative. So, if the names of players i and j
are reversed, the ranking of players i and j must also be re-
versed. Before introducing its definition, we need some fur-
ther notation. Let  : N ! N be a bijection. For a set
S = fi; j; k; :::; tg  N , we denote the image of S through 
(S) = f(i); (j); (k); :::; (t)g.
Definition 4. (Neutrality, N) Let A  N . A solution
RA : C  B(2N ) ! T (A) satisfies the neutrality ax-
iom on C if and only if for all power relations ;w2 C
and each bijection  : N ! N such that (A) = A and
S  T , (S) w (T ) for all S; T 2 2N , then it holds that
iRAj , (i)RwA(j) for every i; j 2 A.
Next axiom says that a social ranking solution needs to be
coherent with the modifications on the performance of dif-
ferent coalitions. Therefore, suppose that in a given power
relation, the solution ranks player i higher or indifferent to
j. If the power relation remains the same for all coalitions
except one that becomes in favor of i, then the solution must
rank player i strictly better than j.
Definition 5. (Monotonicity, M) LetA  N . A solutionRA :
C  B(2N ) ! T (A) satisfies the monotonicity axiom on C
if and only if for all power relations ;w2 C and i; j 2 A
such that:
 there exists a coalition S 2 Ui such that S  S [ i and
S [ i A S, and
 T [ i  T , T [ i A T and T [ j  T , T [ j A T
for all the other coalitions T 2 2N ; T 6= S,
then it holds that iRAj ) iPwA j.
The following theorem shows that the ordinal Banzhaf so-
lution is the unique solution that satisfies the previous three
axioms on the family of linear orders L(2N ).
Theorem 1. Let A  N . A solution RA : L(2N )! T (A) is
the ordinal Banzhaf solution if and only if it satisfies the three
axioms CA, N and M on L(2N ).
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Proof. ()) First, we prove that the ordinal Banzhaf solution
R^A, satisfies the three axioms N, CA and M on L(2N ). It
is straightforward to see that R^A satisfies the N axiom (just
notice that the value si is independent of the individuals’
labels, for all i 2 A and 2 L(2N ))).
Consider two power relations ;w2 L(2N ) such that for all
individuals i; j 2 A the following conditions hold:
i) There exists a bijection i : Ui ! Ui with S [ i  S ,
i(S) [ i A i(S) for all S 2 Ui;
ii) there exists a bijection j : Uj ! Uj with S [ j  S ,
j(S) [ j A j(S) for all S 2 Uj .
We first show that it holds iR^Aj , iR^wAj. Since condition (i)
holds it means that there is a bijection from the set of coali-
tions S 2 Ui with mSi () = 1 (mSi () =  1) to the set
of all S 2 Ui with mSi (w) = 1 (mSi (w) =  1). Moreover,
from condition (ii) it also follows that there exists a bijection
from the set of S 2 Uj with mSj () = 1 (mSj () =  1) to
the set of all S 2 Uj with mSj (w) = 1 (mSj (w) =  1). Then
we have that
si = u
+;
i   u ;i = u+;wi   u ;wi = swi
and
sj = u
+;
j   u ;j = u+;wj   u ;wj = swj ;
that directly imply
iR^Aj , iR^wAj: (5)
By conditions (i) and (ii) and relation (5) it follows that R^A
satisfies the property of coalitional anonymity (CA).
Finally, consider two power relations ;w2 L(2N ) and sup-
pose that for any two individuals i; j 2 A the following con-
ditions hold:
iii) there exists a coalition S 2 Ui such that S  S [ i and
S [ i A S
iv) T [ i  T , T [ i A T and V [ j  V , V [ j A V
for all the other coalitions T 2 Ui; T 6= S, and V 2 Uj .
We want to prove that iR^Aj ) iP^wA j. According to con-
dition (iii) and (iv), we have that
swi = u
+;w
i   u ;wi > u+;i   u ;i = si (6)
and
swj = u
+;w
j   u ;wj = u+;j   u ;j = sj : (7)
Moreover, if iR^Aj, by definition of ordinal Banzhaf score,
we have that
si = u
+;
i   u ;i  u+;j   u ;j = sj (8)
Then, by relations (6), (7) and (8) it immediately follows that
swi = u
+;w
i   u ;wi > u+;wj   u ;wj = swj ; (9)
which means that iP^wA j.
( ) We have to prove that if a solutionRA satisfies axioms
CA, N and M onL(2N ) then it is the ordinal Banzhaf solution
R^A, i.e. iR

Aj , si  sj for all 2 L(2N ) and i; j 2 A.
We start showing that if RA satisfies axioms CA and N
on L(2N ), then for all 2 L(2N ) and i; j 2 A such that
si = s

j , we have that iI

A j.
Consider a power relation 2 L(2N ) with si = sj , for
some i; j 2 A. By Remark 1 and by the fact that there are no
indifferences in the power relation, we also have that
u+;i = u
+;
j and u
 ;
i = u
 ;
j : (10)
Now, consider another power relation w such that for all
S; T 2 2N ,
S  T , (S) w (T );
where  : N ! N is a bijection with (i) = j; (j) = i and
(k) = k for all k 2 A; k 6= i and k 6= j. By axiom N it
holds that
iRAj , jRwAi: (11)
Moreover, by construction of w, it holds that
u+;i = u
+;w
i ; u
 ;
i = u
 ;w
i ; u
+;
j = u
+;w
j ; u
 ;
j = u
 ;w
j :
(12)
Then it is easy to define a bijection i : Ui ! Ui such
that S [ i  S , i(S) [ i A i(S) for all S 2 Ui (defin-
ing a one-to-one correspondence between elements S 2 Ui
with mSi (w) = 1 and those with mSi () = 1, and a one-to-
one correspondence between S 2 Ui withmSi (w) =  1; and
those withmSi () =  1) and, in a similar way, another bijec-
tion j : Uj ! Uj such that S[j  S , j(S)[j A j(S)
for all S 2 Uj . Therefore, from the CA axiom, we have that
iRAj , iRwAj: (13)
From relation (11) and (13), and since RA is total, it im-
mediately follows that
iIA j:
Now, consider a power relation 2 L(2N ) such that q =
u+;i > u
+;
j = p for some integer numbers p and q 2
f0; 1; : : : ; 2n 1g. One can opportunely rearrange the relation
 within each set fS [ ij; S [ i; S [ j; Sg for all S 2 Uij to
obtain a new power relation 02 L(2N ) such that u+;0i =
u+;
0
j = p (for instance, just taking q  p coalitions S 2 Uij ,
with S [ ij  S [ i or S [ j  S and inverting the relation).
Then, since RA satisfies both N and CA, we have that iI
0
A j.
Using a similar argument, and restoring precisely one of the
previously changed comparison to move from  to 0, we
can now form another power relation00 with u+;00i = p+1
and u+;
0
j = p. By the M axiom of RA we have now that
iP
00
A j. By applying this procedure a sufficient number of
times, it is then possible to reconstruct the power relation 
from0 in q p steps, and by the application of the M axiom
of RA at each step, we can conclude that iP

A j.
Remark 2. In the claim of Theorem 1, it is possible to sub-
stitute the domain of linear orders L(2N ) with the larger
domain of power relations C  B(2N ) such that for each
2 C, i; j 2 A and all S 2 Uij the following two conditions
hold: c.1) is transitive and total on fS[ij; S[i; S[j; Sg;
c.2) only strict comparisons hold, i.e. for all A;B 2 fS [
ij; S [ i; S [ j; Sg, A 6= B, we never have A  B.
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S 2 U12 S [ 1 vs. S [ 2
; 1  2
3 13  23
4 14  24
34 134  234
Table 2: CP-comparisons on  of Example 1.
We devote the remaining of this section to the compari-
son of some fundamental features of the CP-majority relation
introduced in [Haret et al., 2018] and the ordinal Banzhaf so-
lution. We first need to define some further notations. The
set of all coalitions S 2 Uij for which S [ i  S [ j (CP-
comparison) is denoted by Dij(). In addition, the cardinal-
ity of the set Dij() is denoted by dij().
Definition 6 (CP-Majority [Haret et al., 2018]). Let 2
B(2N ) and A  N . The Ceteris Paribus (CP-) majority re-
lation is the binary relation RA  N  N such that for all
i; j 2 N :
i RAj , dij()  dji():
Example 6. Consider the power relation defined in Example
1. Table 2 shows the CP-comparisons between 1 and 2. It
holds that 1 PA 2 (d12() = 3 and d21() = 1) according
to the CP-majority relation, whereas 2P^A 1 according to the
ordinal Banzhaf one (see Table 1).
We recall two axioms introduced in [Haret et al., 2018].
The first one states that the social ranking of i and j should
only depend on their relative positions in the power relation
across all coalitions, regardless of the number and the identity
of coalitions’ members.
Definition 7 (Equality of Coalitions, EC). Let A  N . A
solution RA : C  B(2N )  ! T (A) satisfies the Equality
of Coalitions (EC) axiom on C if and only if for all power
relations ;w2 C, i; j 2 A and bijection  : 2Nnfi;jg !
2Nnfi;jg such that S [ fig  S [ fjg , (S) [ fig w
(S) [ fjg for all S 2 Uij , it holds that iRAj , iRwAj:
The second axiom from [Haret et al., 2018], states that if
two elements i and j are indifferent in the social ranking over
a power relation, a single change in the power relation in favor
of i determines a new social ranking also favorable to i.
Definition 8 (Positive Responsiveness, PR). Let A  N . A
solution RA : C  B(2N )  ! T (A) satisfies the Positive
Responsiveness (PR) axiom on C if and only if for all power
relations ;w2 C, i; j 2 A with iRAj and such that for
some T 2 Uij , [T [ fig  T [ fjg and T [ fig A T [ fjg],
or, [T [ fjg  T [ fig and T [ fig ' T [ fjg] and for all
S 2 Uij with S 6= T , S[fig  S[fjg , S[fig w S[fjg,
it holds that iPwA j.
As shown in [Haret et al., 2018], if jAj = 2, the following
axiomatic characterization of the CP-majority holds true.
Theorem 2 ([Haret et al., 2018]). Let A = fi; jg  N be a
set with only two elements. A solutionRA : B(2N )  ! T (A)
associates to each2 B(2N ) the corresponding CP-majority
relation R \ A  A if and only if it satisfies axioms EC, N
and PR on B(2N ).
Remark 3. Note that the two axiomatic characterizations in
Theorem 1 and 2 show two important differences:
i) As extensively discussed in [Haret et al., 2018], the CP-
majority relation, is not necessarily transitive, if jAj >
2, whereas the ordinal Banzhaf solution yields a transi-
tive relation over the elements of A, for any A  N .
ii) The axiomatic characterization for the CP-majority so-
lution holds true over the domain of all binary relations
B(2N ), while the one for the ordinal Banzhaf solution
applies to the restricted domain of linear orders L(2N )
(or the larger one defined in Remark 2).
Even if the CP-majority solution and the ordinal Banzhaf
one may rank individuals in a very different manner (see, for
instance, Example 6), they share some fundamental similari-
ties, at least over sets with only two elements.
First, for both Theorem 1 and 2, the same neutrality axiom
is used. Actually, the axiom of neutrality as introduced in this
paper implies, on the same domain C  B(2N ), the axiom
of neutrality used in [Haret et al., 2018], that only considers
the particular bijection  : N ! N such that for i; j 2 N ,
(i) = j and (j) = i, and (k) = k for all k 2 N n fi; jg.
In addition, for the ordinal Banzhaf solution, the CA ax-
iom plays a role similar to the one played by the EC ax-
iom for the CP-majority: the social ranking must be invariant
with respect to particular permutations of coalitions. How-
ever, how coalitions are permuted is different in the two ax-
ioms, focusing on permutations preserving the number of CP-
comparisons in the EC axiom, and on permutations preserv-
ing the number of positive and negative ordinal marginal con-
tributions in the CA one.
Finally, the PR axiom for the CP-majority solution and the
M axiom for the ordinal Banzhaf solution follow a similar
principle for breaking ties in favour of individuals that im-
prove their position. However, there are two main differences
here: first, in the CP-majority, we consider improvements
on CP-comparisons, while for the ordinal Banzhaf solution
we consider improvements on ordinal marginal contributions;
second, due to the domain restriction on L(2N ), the possibil-
ity to have indifference is not considered for the characteriza-
tion of the ordinal Banzhaf solution.
A further similarity between the two solutions is discussed
in the next section, where the ordinal Banzhaf solution and
the CP-majority are presented as two special cases of a new
family of weighted majority relations.
5 Weighted Majority Relations
We start by rewriting the definition of CP-majority as follows.
Let A  N and i; j 2 A. Then,
i RAj , j Dij() jj Dji() j ,
X
S2Uij
dSij()  0;
where
dSij() =
(
1 if S [ i  S [ j;
 1 if S [ j  S [ i;
0 otherwise,
(14)
for all S 2 Uij . We can generalize this definition, to any non-
negative linear combination of the terms dSij , for all S 2 Uij .
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S 2 U12 S [ 1 vs. S [ 2 weights wS12
; 1  2 1
3 13  23 2
4 14  24 2
34 134  234 3
Table 3: The weight scheme of Example 7 on power relation (1).
Definition 9 (Weighted majority relation). Let 2 B(2N ),
A  N and let w = [wSij ]i;j2A;S22N :i;j =2S be a weight
scheme such that wSij  0 for all i; j 2 A and S 2 Uij .
The weighted majority relation associated to w is the binary
relation R;wA  AA such that for all i; j 2 A  N :
iR;wA j ,
X
S2Uij
wSij
dSij()  0:
Obviously, if wSij = 1 for all i; j 2 A and S 2 Uij , then
we get the CP-majority, i.e. R;wA = R

A .
Example 7. Consider the power relation (1). Let A = f1; 2g
and consider a weight scheme w where wS12 = jSj + 1 for
each S 2 U12, as shown in Table 3. We have that 1P; wA 2,
since
P
S2U12 w
S
12
dS12() = 1 + 2 + 2  3 = 2 > 0.
Definition 10 (Bz-distance). Let 2 L(2N ), i; j 2 N and
let S 2 Uij . The Banzhaf (Bz-) distance between i and j with
respect to S is denoted by w^ = [w^Sij()]i;j2A;S2Uij and is
defined as the cardinality of an intersection as follows:
j fS; S[ijg\fT : S[i  T  S[j or S[j  T  S[ig j :
Note that w^Sij() is just the number of S and S[ij between
S [ i and S [ j in the power relation . For instance, if we
have S [ 1  S [ 12  S [ 2  S, then w^S12() =1 and if
we have S [ 3  S  S [ 34  S [ 4, then w^S34() =2.
Remark 4. Notice that the Bz-distance w^Sij() is a well-
defined metric: it can only take values 0,1, or 2 (non-
negativity); w^Sii() = 0 (identity); w^Sij() = w^Sji() (sym-
metry); w^Sik()  w^Sij()+ w^Sjk() for all S 2 2N with
i; j; k 2 S (triangle inequality).
We are now ready to prove that the weighted majority re-
lation based on the Bz-distance is equivalent to the ordinal
Banzhaf solution.
Theorem 3. Let 2 L(2N ) and A  N . We have that
R;w^A = R^

A:
Proof. We have to prove that for all i; j 2 A
iR;w^A j , si  sj :
First note that we can rewrite the difference of ordinal
Banzhaf scores si   sj as follows
si   sj =
X
S2Ui
mSi () 
X
S2Uj
mSj () =
=
X
S2Uij
(mSi () +mS[ji ())  (mSj () +mS[ij ()):
S 2 2Nnfi;jg w^Sij si   sj
S [ i  S [ j  S [ ij  S 0 0
S [ i  S [ ij  S [ j  S 1 2
S [ i  S [ ij  S  S [ j 2 4
S [ i  S [ j  S  S [ ij 0 0
S [ i  S  S [ j  S [ ij 1 2
S [ i  S  S [ ij  S [ j 2 4
S  S [ i  S [ j  S [ ij 0 0
S  S [ i  S [ ij  S [ j 1 2
S  S [ ij  S [ i  S [ j 0 0
S [ ij  S [ i  S [ j  S 0 0
S [ ij  S [ i  S  S [ j 1 2
S [ ij  S  S [ i  S [ j 0 0
Table 4: Bz-distance w^Sij and ordinal Banzhaf scores s

i   sj for
dSij() = 1 (the symmetric case dSij() =  1 is omitted).
Consider all coalitions S 2 Uij such that dSij() = 1 as
reported in Table 4 (the case dSij() =  1 is very similar).
It follows that X
S2Uij
w^Sij
dSij()
=
1
2
 X
S2Uij
(mSi () +mS[ji ())  (mSj () +mS[ij ())

:
Therefore, we have that
P
S2Uij w^
S
ij
dSij()  0 iff si  sj ,
which concludes the proof.
We showed that the CP-majority and the ordinal Banzhaf
solution belong to the family of weigthed majority relations.
Note that one can obtain other members of this family by
assigning other non-negative real values to a weight scheme
such (for instance, the size of coalitions, etc.).
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have studied the problem of ranking individ-
uals given an ordinal ranking over the set of coalitions formed
by them. Following the analogy with cooperative games, we
have extended the classical notion of Banzhaf value to our
ordinal framework. We have analyzed the ordinal Banzhaf
solution using a property-driven approach and we have com-
pared its fundamental features with the ones of another so-
lution from the literature, the CP-majority relation. Finally,
we have introduced a new family of relations over the set of
individuals that includes the ordinal Banzhaf solution and the
CP-majority one, and many others.
Since we have characterized the ordinal Banzhaf solution
over the domain of all linear orders, as a direction for future
work it would be interesting to investigate how the ordinal
Banzhaf solution can be extended to other families of power
relations, and to see which axioms characterize this solution
on a those classes. Another open problem is to study and ax-
iomatically characterize ordinal versions of other semivalues
[Carreras et al., 2003] like, for instance, the Shapley value
[Shapley, 1953].
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